This article examines Zimbabwe's indigenisation legislation, points out some of its inadequacies and draws lessons from South Africa's experiences in implementing its own indigenisation legislation. Both countries have encountered challenges relating to an upsurge in unethical business conduct aimed at defeating the objectives of their black economic empowerment programmes, policies and legislation. This practice is called business fronting. However, while South Africa has succeeded in enacting a credible piece of legislation aimed at addressing this issue, Zimbabwe has yet to do so. The article points out that the failure to specifically regulate against business fronting poses the most significant threat to the attainment of the laudable aims and objectives of the indigenisation programme and related legislation. In order to avoid becoming a regulatory regime that is notorious not only for being functionally ineffective but also for tacitly permitting racketeering in reality, the article argues for the adoption of antifronting legislation in Zimbabwe using the South African legislation as a model.
Introduction
Black economic empowerment programmes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have often seen the indigenous people who were previously and who remain largely excluded from the economic mainstream going into a state of euphoria 1 based on the genuine belief that such programmes are an effective panacea 2 for their existential socio-economic challenges. 3 This belief appears to be affirmed by the values set out in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, 4 which recognise and advance the right to the free disposition of wealth and natural resources in the best interests of indigenous peoples. 5 It is thus not surprising to see that indigenisation in Zimbabwe is founded on a socio-political creed that land and mineral resources exist in the country's territory to a greater extent 6 for the benefit of indigenous people 7 and to a lesser extent for multinational corporations. 8 The term multinational corporation, for the purposes of the implementation of indigenous economic empowerment laws, is often controversially understood to refer to western-owned companies and not Asian-owned companies. 9 The need to remedy colonial injustices and significantly improve the extent of the participation of indigenous Zimbabweans in the country's economic activities is often advanced as the primary justification for indigenisation programmes which seek to economically empower previously disadvantaged Zimbabweans. 10 Premised on the need to redistribute the country's economic resources in a manner that favours indigenous Zimbabweans, 11 Magure points out that the indigenisation programme has promised much to the anxious and highly expectant majority but delivered little. 12 Instead, many of the benefits from the indigenisation programme have gone to a few well-connected elites 13 due largely to unethical business practices such as business fronting. 14 Accordingly, in order to ensure that each and every indigenous Zimbabwean benefits from the indigenisation of land as well as other economic resources and is enabled to enter the economic mainstream, the IEEA urgently requires strengthening through the inclusion of specific anti-fronting clauses 9 Makwiramiti 2011 http://www.polity.org.za/article/in-the-name-of-economic-empower ment-a-case-for-south-africa-and-zimbabwe-2011-02-24. The Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe once argued that, "Why should we continue to have companies and organisations that are supported by America and Britain without hitting them back? The time has come for us to revenge and one way of (doing this) is for us to use the IEEA. That Act gives us authority to take over the companies. We can begin with 51%, but in some cases we must read the riot act and say this is only 50% but if you do not lift the sanctions we will take 100%." Also see Matyszak 2010 http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Everything%20you%20ever%20wan ted%20to%20know.pdf; and Matyszak 2013 http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/ demgg/rau_zimplats_saga_120423.pdf. or alternatively the enactment of an independent anti-fronting legislation. 15 It is therefore not surprising that at the time of writing this article, the Public Sector Corporate Governance Bill had been tabled before parliament with a view to introducing a law which addresses corruption and other related maladministration challenges in the public and private sectors. 16 Specifically, the law will seek to address any murky business activities in both the private and public sectors and ensure that such practices are punishable at law. 17 This in itself is sufficient evidence of the Zimbabwean Government's acknowledgement of the inadequacies of the existing laws in fighting corruption and other irregular business activities, including business fronting.
This article argues that presently, because of the omission to provide for the problem of fronting, Zimbabwe has inadequate black economic empowerment legislation which has created a reality in which the benefits of the legislation's implementation appear to accrue largely to the wellconnected, politically favoured elites and their associates. 18 The article is divided into six parts. The first part introduces the concept of indigenisation in Zimbabwe, while the second presents a brief description of the country's indigenisation regulatory framework. The third part undertakes an analysis of incidents of business fronting in Zimbabwe and shows why it is easy to front. The fourth part examines the regulation of business fronting in South Africa, while the fifth part draws lessons for Zimbabwe from South Africa's amendment of its black economic empowerment legislation in order to effectively address the challenge of fronting. The last part of the article offers recommendations on how best to strengthen Zimbabwe's indigenisation laws in preventing fronting.
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Incorporating anti-fronting clauses in the IEEA or enacting anti-fronting legislation would be a sign that the Zimbabwean government is sincere in its efforts to arrest the scourge of fronting, which is a significant aspect of corruption in Zimbabwe. It will also show that the Government is serious about implementing its commitments regarding the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol against Corruption adopted on the 14 th of August 2001 in Blantyre, Malawi.
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The Bill's main objective is to address the inadequacies of the existing laws on corporate governance in addressing issues of unethical business practices in Zimbabwe. The presentation of the Bill before parliament has been linked to the need to ensure that individuals, government officials, and company representatives do not defeat the objectives of the Zim Asset Policy. The Zim Asset Policy itself "… was crafted to achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored on indigenisation, economic empowerment and employment creation which will be largely propelled by the judicious exploitation of the country's abundant human and natural resources". See the full Zim Asset Policy at Government of Zimbabwe Date Unknown http://www.dpcorp.co.zw/assets/zim-asset.pdf. 
Zimbabwean indigenisation law
Indigenisation policies and processes in Zimbabwe are regulated by the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA). 19 The IEEA provides the policy definition of empowerment as:
The creation of an environment which enhances the performance of … economic activities of indigenous Zimbabweans into which they would have been introduced or involved through indigenisation. 20 Emphasis in the definition is clearly on the compelling need to ensure that the benefits of the indigenisation policy cascade down to indigenous Zimbabweans in their multitudes and not just to a few politically connected elites and their foreign business partners, which may be the current state of affairs. 21 It is submitted that the need to maximise the reach or dispersal of those benefits is the reason why section 2(1) 22 of the IEEA further defines indigenisation as:
… a deliberate involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans in the economic activities of the country, to which hitherto they had no access, so as to ensure the equitable ownership of the nation's resources. 23 The indigenisation policy of Zimbabwe, the IEEA, as well as the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Regulations seek to achieve the following objectives: Section 2(1) also defines empowerment as "…the creation of an environment which enhances the performance of the economic activities of indigenous Zimbabweans into which they would have been introduced or involved through indigenization".
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Section 2(1) of the IEEA.
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Section 2(1) of the IEEA. Minister's decision to apportion 51% of such an entity to indigenous Zimbabweans. 31 The methodology for implementing the controversial IEEA 32 is prescribed in the equally controversial Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations. 33 The controversy lies mainly in the 51% indigenisation equity threshold imposed on all foreign-owned businesses, as illustrated in the The specified share transactions issues regarding the 51% equity threshold appear to constitute a threat to business investments in that they are not negotiable. 34 Section 3(5) of the IEEA provides that an exemption from complying with the said regulatory requirements is permissible only in instances where the foreign-owned company is able to furnish evidence that the transfer of a lower percentage of its shares or a longer period of achieving the indigenisation objectives is appropriate in its special or unique circumstances. 35 However, section 3(5) has been a source of contention as policy makers had appeared to suggest that it implies that the 51% equity threshold is negotiable. 36 In fact section 3(5) suggests otherwise, as it provides that:
The Minister may prescribe that a lesser share than fifty-one per centum or a lesser interest than a controlling interest may be acquired by indigenous Zimbabweans in any business in terms of subsections (1) In justifying the indigenisation programme as reflected in the IEEA, the government has been consistent in advancing and relying upon a populist argument that the country's land and mineral resources should benefit Zimbabweans and not only multinational companies. 38 This is probably premised on the genuine need to ensure that indigenous Zimbabweans and not multinational companies receive the greater share of the proceeds flowing from the exploitation of the country's land and mineral resources. (20) 10 directed at reform of the society's economic order in order to achieve an equitable, fair and just distribution of responsibilities and benefits. 45 However, it must be ascertained whether the contemporary capitalist and/or neo-liberal economic order 46 can effectively accommodate social policies designed to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor and, for that purpose, embrace the implementation of socio-economic programmes implicit in the distributive justice theory, such as indigenisation programmes. 47 Alvarez has pointed out that today neoliberal ideology shapes institutions whose policies account for contemporary international economic law. 48 Governments are not an exception. This concern is readily manifest in the fact that whereas section 3 of the IEEA and the broad tenor of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment General Notice 114 of 2011 is that every Zimbabwean should benefit from the country's resources, section 2(1) of the IEEA excludes the State/Government as a specific beneficiary of indigenisation. This suggests that only individuals and juristic persons were earmarked to benefit from the indigenisation programme. Reference in section 2(1) of the IEEA is made to the following categories of beneficiaries as being the targets of indigenisation: "1) a natural person, 2) a company 3) an association, syndicate or partnership amongst others ...". 49
There may be some justification for the exclusion of the government as a direct beneficiary of indigenisation. After all, the listed categories of beneficiaries are subjects of the State, whose business operations have the potential to directly or indirectly contribute to the fiscus and/or revenue base of the country. However, the net effect of excluding the State as a direct beneficiary of the indigenisation laws in Zimbabwe is that unscrupulous individuals 50 and companies owned by such individuals or persons related 45 Ratnapala Jurisprudence 335.
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The neoliberalism economic policy model and ideology places emphasis on free trade. to or connected to them have become largely responsible for an upsurge in corruption. 51 As a result the gains from the mineral resources which should be available for the pursuit of the best interests of the State and its subjects at large are being externalised through the collusion of these companies and individuals. 52 If excluding the State as a beneficiary of indigenisation 53 promotes corrupt business practices such as fronting, then the underlying legal or policy position adopted is problematic, at least in the Zimbabwean context. 54 As a result of the exclusion, instead of increasing the participation of the black majority, the current regulatory practice may increase the pace of widening inequality between the wealthy and the indigent; 55 and it could also undermine the implementation of the indigenisation programmes and laws as the resources necessary for that purpose would not be available. 56 sentencing as well as punishment for corruption and public institutions that do not act in response to citizens' needs".
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Coltart 2008 https://www.cato.org/publications/development-policy-analysis/decadesuffering-zimbabwe-economic-collapse-political-repression-under-robert-mugabe.
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Chitereka and Hamauswa 2014 ZJPE 69. Also see Matunhu 2011 AJHC 65; and Murombo 2013 LEDJ 33. 53 Makoni 2014 COC 160. Indigenisation is defined as "a Government-initiated process whereby it limits certain industrial sectors to its native citizens only, and hence forces foreigners (aliens) to sell those targeted assets. The Government does not have ownership of the assets, but rather ensures a stronger hold over its domestic economy and through indigenisation can encourage and ensure the growth of local firms and individuals". Also see Rood 1976 JMAS 427; and Rood 1977 JMAS 489. 54 As a possible alternative to indigenisation, the Zimbabwean Government could have considered a nationalisation policy which aims to benefit the nation as a whole as opposed to individuals and private companies owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. Nationalisation refers to the process when a government initiates "…asset seizure as part of social and economic reform to improve livelihoods of a country's nationals". See Makoni 2014 COC 160. According to Atud, nationalisation could offer the following benefits to a country. It a) allows profits to be equitably distributed amongst more people, and the country as a whole; b) leads to regional economic growth and not just national economic growth; c) focuses more on citizens' social welfare as opposed to profiteering; d) leads to a country's greater economic performance and efficiency; and e) promotes employment creation and job security. Also see Efforts to realise the benefits of indigenisation have not achieved the intended objectives. Even supplementary policies aimed at strengthening Zimbabwe's economy so as to further enhance the viability of the indigenisation policies have not met with success. For example, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation policy has failed due in part to the poor indigenisation policies. See Government of Zimbabwe Date Unknown http://www.dpcorp.co.zw/assets/zim-Against this background, unregulated, unethical and fraudulent practices such as business fronting, which subvert the pre-eminent objective of increasing the participation of the indigenous Zimbabweans 57 in the economic mainstream, must be systematically confronted.
Business fronting in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwean courts have not had the opportunity to pass judgement on the troubling issue of business fronting and the duty of State organs in responding to allegations of fronting. This could be due in part to the politicised nature of the country's judicial system. 58 The indigenisation programme was introduced and implemented at the behest of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union -Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). 59 Not surprisingly, most of the current beneficiaries of the indigenisation programme are people sympathetic to ZANU-PF and its policies. 60 These beneficiaries include members of the judiciary such as judges, who received farms forcefully taken from white owners at the height of the chaotic land reform programme. 61 The persons who perpetrate violations of indigenisation laws also appear to be members of ZANU-PF, who know that as long as they are in the good books of the country's and party's leadership they will not be prosecuted. 62 The practical result is that there is no rapidly developing jurisprudence on business fronting in Zimbabwe. However, this has not stopped concerns being raised in the media regarding incidents of business fronting. As already highlighted above, Zimbabwean courts currently have a tendency not to act independently of the executive, as attempts to do so can lead to a purging of judicial officials. 86 Accordingly, the implementation of legislation such as the IEEA can be manipulated to enrich politically connected indigenes and thereby promote, rather than discourage, the practice of business fronting in Zimbabwe. 87
Regulation of fronting in South Africa
The fronting challenge in South Africa was exacerbated by the fact that, until 2011, the courts had not definitively pronounced on government's duties in responding to fronting practices; but the opportunity arose in the landmark case of Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd. 88 This case allowed the Constitutional Court to pronounce itself inter alia on the policy rationales of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which it regarded as a constitutionally mandated governmental response to "one of the most vicious and degrading effects of racial discrimination in South Africa", being "…the economic exclusion and exploitation of black people". 89 The Constitutional Court's ruling in the Viking Pony case effectively imposes an obligation on an organ of state that has received a complaint about alleged fronting to properly investigate the complaint and to act accordingly. 90 The ruling in the Viking Pony case was followed in 2013 by the passing into law of the Section 1(e)(a) of the B-BBEEA Act defines window dressing as an act of introducing black people to an enterprise on the "basis of tokenism and maybe in the form of: 1) discouraging or inhibiting them from substantively participating in the core activities of an enterprise and discouraging or inhibiting them from substantively participating in the stated areas and/or levels of the participation". Also see DTI 2013 http://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/fronting.
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Section 1(e)(b)-(c) of the B-BBEEA Act defines benefit diversion as "initiatives implemented where economic benefits received as a result of the B-BBEE status of an enterprise do not flow to black people in the ratio as specified in relevant legal documents". Also see Honeycomb Transformation 2013 http://www.honeycombtransformation.co.za/fronting-companys-ownership/.
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Section 1(e)(d) of the B-BBEEA Act defines opportunistic intermediaries to include "... enterprises that have concluded agreements with other enterprises with a view to leveraging the opportunistic intermediary's favourable B-BBEE status in circumstances where the agreement involves: 1) significant limitations or restrictions upon the identity of the opportunistic intermediary's suppliers, service providers, clients or customers; 2) the maintenance of their business operations in a context reasonably considered improbable having regard to resources; 3) terms and conditions that are not negotiated at arms-length on a fair and reasonable basis". The challenges identified above as being likely to result from the element of vagueness inherent in a broad definition of "fronting" are certain to be mitigated by the second facet of the definition of "fronting" in the B-BBEEA Act, which explicitly identifies certain specific conducts as constituting fronting. This part of the definition s 1(e) declares "fronting practice" as: "... including but not limited to practices" connected to a B-BBEE initiative -(a) in terms of which black persons who are appointed to an enterprise are discouraged or inhibited from substantially participating in the core activities of that enterprise; or (b) in terms of which the economic benefits received as a result of the broad-based black economic empowerment status of an enterprise do not flow to black people in the ratio specified in the relevant legal documentation". In addition, s 1(e)(c) provides that fronting includes practices in connection with a B-BBEE initiative "involving the conclusion of a legal relationship with a black person for the purpose of the enterprise achieving a certain level of B-BBEE compliance without granting the black person economic benefits". Lastly, s 1(e)(d) provides that fronting includes practices in connection with a B-BBEE initiative: "involving the conclusion of an agreement with another enterprise in order to achieve or enhance B-BBEE status in circumstances in which i) there are significant limitations on the identity of suppliers ... ii) the maintenance of business operations ... is reasonably considered improbable and iii) the terms and conditions were not negotiated .. the role of the regulatory watchdog over issues pertaining to the B-BBEE Act. 100 The B-BEE Commission which will be established as:
… a juristic person with the duty of providing oversight to the B-BEEE process has the responsibility to: 1) investigate cases of fronting; 2) investigate complaints; and 3) receive and monitor reports on B-BBEE from organs of state and listed entities. 101 The role of the B-BBEE Commission 102 could be likened to a limited extent to the role of the Anti-Corruption Commission in Zimbabwe. 103 However, the difference between the two is that the B-BEE Commission deals with matters specifically related to the BEE programme, which makes it a specialised juristic person unlike the Anti-Corruption Commission, which has no defined area of speciality and appears to have been intended to deal with all matters of corruption. 104 The effectiveness of such a commission is likely to be minimal, as it lacks expertise on the multiplicity of complex issues which are required to come before it. Further the Anti-Corruption Commissioners are appointed by the State President and function on the lines of political patronage, just like the judiciary in Zimbabwe, which fact places the prospects of the Commission's effectiveness in serious doubt. 105 Furthermore, the penalties prescribed for business fronting under the B-BBEE Amendment Act are fairly severe and therefore more likely to generate an effective deterrence effect than those in their Zimbabwean counterparts. This submission flows from the fact that the B-BBEE Amendment Act creates a number of offences and associated penalties. 106 For example, it creates an offence for the intentional misrepresentation of 100 Section 8 of the B-BBEEA Act. Under this provision, s 13B is inserted into the B-BBEE Act to provide for the establishment and status of the B-BBEE Commission.
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Section 13B of the B-BBEEA Act. Also see s 13F of the B-BBEEA Act, which is titled "Functions of Commission", and s 13J of the B-BBEEA Act, which is titled "Investigations by the Commission". Section 13F of the B-BBEEA Act. Also see s 13J of the B-BBEEA Act. Compare this with the preamble of the ZACA, which provides that the purpose of the Anti-corruption Commission is to address corruption "…as a matter of extreme urgency, and … fight corruption and … put in place measures and mechanisms that would eliminate the scourge of corruption…". It is submitted that one such mechanism which the Zimbabwean Anti-Corruption Commission is yet to advocate is an anti-fronting piece of legislation. Fronting requires a specialised legal instrument if it is to be effectively dealt with. information for the purposes of securing a favourable B-BBEE status; providing false information to a government entity; and failure by a public officer to report any offence in terms of the B-BBEE Act. 107 A person convicted in terms of the B-BBEE Amendment Act could be liable to a fine 108 or imprisonment of up to ten years for a section 13O(1)(a)-(d) 109 violation and a period not exceeding 12 months for a section 13O(2) 110 violation. There is no guidance as to what the extent of imprisonment could be, as fronting is not yet specifically legislated against in the IEEA. However, based on the experience of the implementation of indigenisation and related regulations in Zimbabwe thus far, it is highly probable that a stiff penalty may be imposed on a person who is not politically connected and who is found to have engaged in conduct resembling business fronting. Another option available to the authorities in Zimbabwe is to rely on the level 12 penalty provided in the CLCRA. That penalty currently stands at a miserly USD 2000 which, it is submitted, would hardly deter anyone from committing a potentially high profit-yielding economic crime such as business fronting. 111
In respect of juristic persons, the B-BBEE Amendment Act allows the imposition of a fine of up to a maximum of ten per cent of the juristic person's annual turnover. 112 And in addition to the penalties, any person convicted of any offence under the B-BBEE Amendment Act may be banned from further contracting with any Government entity. 113 It is submitted in this respect that (2), which makes it an offence for a B-BBEE verification professional or any procurement officer to fail to report the making of an attempt to commit an offence listed in s 13O(1), the punishment shall be a fine as provided for in s 13O(3)(a) or both the fine and imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months. the penalties imposed by the South African B-BBEEA Act are on the face of it sufficiently stiff to produce the much desired deterrence effect from the perspective of would-be offenders. 114 In this regard the Zimbabwean legislative framework presents further significant weaknesses. The penalty of USD 2000 clearly does not match up to the ten years imprisonment or fine of 10% of the annual turnover of a company provided for in the South African legislative regime. This particular difference in the regulation of fronting between the two countries might explain why the practice exists in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, to the extent that fronting threatens to derail the country's controversial indigenisation programme, the penalty-related provisions of the Zimbabwean legislative framework stand to gain much strength from a reform process which embraces the South African approach as epitomising "best practice" in the prevention and regulation of business fronting.
Lessons from South Africa
The reason for South Africa's adopting the anti-fronting legislation was that within a few years of introducing the Black Economic Empowerment (hereinafter BEE) programme 115 it became evident that in practice the benefits were not reaching large numbers of those intended to be the beneficiaries of the programme. 116 Rather, the pattern emerged of a few well-connected business elites colluding with politically connected black elites to capture the opportunities spawned by the programme. 117 A robust and systematic approach had to be adopted to address this untenable situation. 118 The result was the passing of the Broad-Based Black Economic details are recorded in this Register together with the details of the crime committed. This creates an additional penalty for the offenders.
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However, it should be noted that the efficacy of the penalty provisions in the B-BBEEA Act is yet to be proven in practice, as there are still no judicial precedents relating to the penalties prescribed under the B-BBEEA Act. This is obviously because the provisions have been in force for only a little over one year. Of the two proposed approaches, the first option would be preferred, as there is an already existing legal framework regulating indigenisation issues in the form of the IEEA. To that end, incorporating the anti-fronting provisions in that legislation would be more cost-effective and less timeconsuming.
And in undertaking such a law reform process, Zimbabwe can draw valuable lessons from South Africa, 123 which has recently amended its BEE legislation to combat business fronting. In promulgating the amendment statute, South African policy makers accepted that business fronting is a significant contributory factor preventing the success of the country's 
